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Three Approaches to Human
Cognitive Development:
Neo-nativism,
Neuroconstructivism, and
Dynamic Enskillment
Mirko Farina
ABSTRACT
In Section 1, I introduce three views that explain human cognitive development from
different standpoints: Marcus’s neo-nativism, standard neuroconstructivism, and
neo-neuroconstructivism. In Section 2, I assess Marcus’s attempt to reconcile nativism
with developmental flexibility. In Section 3, I argue that in structurally reconfiguring
nativism, Marcus ends up transforming it into an unrecognizable form, and I claim that
his view (neo-nativism) could be accommodated within the more general framework
provided by standard neuroconstructivism. In Section 4, I focus on recent empirical
findings in neuropsychology and cultural/social neuroscience, and propose a friendly
revision to standard neuroconstructivism, thus developing the neo-neuroconstructivist
view. I conclude the article in Section 5 by analysing the implications of the results
discussed in Section 4 for both neo-nativism and standard neuroconstructivism.
1 Introduction
2 Marcus’s Neo-nativism
3 Is Marcus’s Neo-nativism Really a Form of Nativism?
4 Neo-neuroconstructivism and Dynamic Enskillment
5 Conclusion
1 Introduction
In this article I discuss three views that aim to explain human cognitive
and cortical development: (i) Gary Marcus’s neo-nativism, (ii) standard neu-
roconstructivism, and (iii) neo-neuroconstructivism. I first distinguish how
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these theories are thought to relate in the mainstream literatures and then go
on to analyse how I believe they actually relate. I argue that neo-nativism is
not that distinct from standard neuroconstructivism (and could be accommo-
dated within its richer theoretical framework) and that standard neurocon-
structivism, in order to fully account for recent empirical findings, needs to be
revised along the lines envisaged by what I call ‘neo-neuroconstructivism’.
I begin this introduction by offering a short description for each of the three
accounts at stake, providing some general philosophical background for each
of the three positions.1 Having done this, I analyse the links between them and
summarize the arguments of the article.
(1) Neo-nativism, which I discuss in Section 2, is Marcus’s theory that as-
serts that the cognitive structures with which we come to the world are ‘pre-
wired at birth’ (Marcus [2004b]) and can (occasionally) be reprogrammed later
in life by specific experience-dependent activities (appropriately mediated by
the regulatory action of genes). This position draws from the conceptual pal-
ette developed by evolutionary psychologists (such as Barkow et al. [1992];
Pinker [1997]), but significantly differs from hardwired nativism (see Section 2
below for a discussion of the differences between hardwiring and prewiring)2
because it doesn’t posit the existence at birth of domain-specific, functionally
specifiable modules.3 Instead it accepts, at least in principle, the idea of rewir-
ing as a way through which experience can alter and very partially repro-
gramme the inborn predispositions with which we come to the world. So, it
is a strength of Marcus’s view that in considering questions about the contri-
bution of genes to development, he pays attention to the role of environmental
1 I do not discuss standard nativism in this article, but rather a specific strand of
nativism—Marcus’s neo-nativism—in relation to standard neuroconstructivism and my own
view, neo-neuroconstructivism. For critical discussion of standard nativism, see
(Karmiloff-Smith [1992], [2009]).
2 Hardwired nativism is a complex position that includes very different emphases and variants:
(i) nativism about contents or concepts (Fodor [1975]); (ii) genetic determinism (Cronin [1991]);
and (iii) nativism about cognitive architectures (Barkow et al. [1992]; Pinker [1997]). Since
Marcus does not accept hardwired nativism, I set aside the goal of providing a critical exposition
of this position and focus solely on his view.
3 Jerry Fodor ([1983]) originally defined modules as ‘functionally specialized cognitive systems’
that have nine crucial features: (i) domain specificity, (ii) mandatory operation, (iii) limited central
accessibility, (iv) fast processing, (v) informational encapsulation, (vi) shallow outputs, (vii) fixed
neural architecture, (viii) characteristic and specific breakdown patterns, and (ix) characteristic
ontogenetic pace and sequencing. Fodor later narrowed down the essential features of any
module to two: domain specificity and information encapsulation (Fodor [2000]). In his view,
modules can be found in peripheral processing but not in central processing. Evolutionary psych-
ologists (such as Barkow et al. [1992]) have defined a module as a functionally specialized cogni-
tive system that is domain specific. Modules, on their account, are the units of mental processing
that have evolved in response to selection pressures and that contain innate knowledge about the
class of information processed. Unlike Fodor, Cosmides and Tooby believe that quite often
modules can be found in central processing and that they can perform a number of functions.
Their thesis is, for this reason, known as ‘the massive modularity hypothesis’. For some argu-
ments in favour and against the massive modularity hypothesis, see (Buller [2005]; Prinz [2006];
Carruthers [2006]). For background interpretations of modularity, see (Coltheart [1999]).
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activities in shaping human cognitive behaviour. However, it is important to
note that, for Marcus, genes still maintain a special role in guiding develop-
ment, as they possess a priority over environmental contributions (more on
this later).
(2) Standard neuroconstructivism (Quartz and Sejnowski [1997]; Mareschal
et al. [2007]; Karmiloff-Smith [2009]), addressed in Section 3, proposes
a unifying framework for the study of cognition in neuroscience and aims
at describing the way inwhich the brainprogressively sculpts itself and gradually
becomes specialized over developmental time, by deploying a number of differ-
ent strategic cognitive tools, including phylogenetic developmental processes
(such as gene–gene interaction or gene–environment interaction) and ontogen-
etic developmental processes (such as pre- and post-natal interactions). A cen-
tral goal of standard neuroconstructivism is to understand how the neural
substrates supporting mental representations are shaped. Standard neurocon-
structivism explains the development of neural systems as ‘heavily constrained
by multiple interacting factors intrinsic and extrinsic to the developing organ-
ism’ (Westermann et al. [2007], p. 75), so it focuses on the construction of rep-
resentations in the developing brain and on the role that the environment plays
in shaping the biological constraints with which we come to the world.
According to standard neuroconstructivism, genetic activity is profoundly
modified by neural, behavioural, and external environmental events, and all
of these interactions play an au pair role in cognitive development. Thus, stand-
ard neuroconstructivism (unlike neo-nativism) acknowledges that the progres-
sive specialization of neural structures is, to a large extent, driven by the
environment and that both the genes and the environment play an equally im-
portant role (no ontological priority is given) in determining developmental
outcomes. Furthermore, in the primary neuroconstructivist texts (Karmiloff-
Smith [1992]; Elman et al. [1996]) there is a total, or near total, focus on brain
plasticity in the early phases of development, at the expense of the plasticity
found in later life. In fact, standard neuroconstructivism emphasizes ‘the special
role of the evolving social environment for the developing child’ (Westermann
et al. [2010], p. 724).
(3) Neo-neuroconstructivism, which I discuss in Section 4, is an account of
brain organization and cognitive development that retains a solid (standard)
neuroconstructivist basis, but attempts to update and extend this basis in light
of recent empirical findings in neuropsychology and cultural/social neurosci-
ence.4 Neo-neuroconstructivism is therefore an improved account of the role
4 There are two important remarks to make about what I have called standard neuro-
constructivism. The first point concerns the characterization of it I have given above. In par-
ticular, it concerns the last point (sensitive window of opportunity) that I introduced earlier on
in this section. In the description I have provided above, there is no reference to the crucial role
that evolving socio-cultural environments play in reorganizing and redirecting the functioning
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of plasticity in development than appears in either standard neuroconstructi-
vism or Marcus’s neo-nativism. It takes on-board much of the standard
neuroconstructivist conceptual palette, but introduces within it a much
needed and genuinely innovative dimension, which I call ‘dynamic enskill-
ment’ (see Section 4), that I believe standard neuroconstructivists have failed
to take into account when they first formulated their framework. Dynamic
enskillment, the central concept of the neo-neuroconstructivist view I am after,
is a notion inspired by (but not fully coincident with) the patterned practices
approach developed by Andreas Roepstorff and colleagues at the University
of Aarhus (Roepstorff et al. [2010]). Dynamic enskillment is, roughly speak-
ing, the idea that both brain organization and cortical development are heavily
dependent on patterned practices and culture-sensitive activities throughout
the entire lifespan.5 Dynamic enskillment therefore aims at investigating life-
span changes in behaviour as a result of interactions, maturation, and learn-
ing, and tries to integrate empirical evidence across different domains (from
behavioural to neural levels of analysis), while maximally acknowledging the
dramatic power of brain plasticity and rewiring in an individual’s lifetime (not
only in early stages of life as standard neuroconstructivists have rightly
pointed out). In doing so, dynamic enskillment affirms that adult entrench-
ment in different socio-cultural contexts can profoundly shape the functioning
of the human mind and generate completely dissimilar neural responses (even
among conspecifics) through embodiment and internalization, leading to struc-
turally different, cognitively diverse, and deeply enculturated brains. Dynamic
enskillment thus adds another element to the standard neuroconstructivist
of our brains during adulthood; rather, standard neuroconstructivists have only envisaged ‘the
special role of the evolving social environment for the developing child’ (Westermann et al.
[2010], p. 724). So, standard neuroconstructivists haven’t put much emphasis on developmental
issues throughout the lifespan, but rather have confined themselves to the influence of formative
experiences and of experience-dependent activities in early childhood. This is part of the reason
why in this article I propose a friendly revision, an update if you like, of this framework. The
second point is related to the relevance and impact of the neuroconstructivist perspective in
philosophy. Much of the philosophical enthusiasm for the developmentally based work of
Elman ([1993]) and Karmiloff-Smith ([1992])—which culminated in the collaboration between
Clark and Karmiloff-Smith ([1993]) and, more famously, in the publication of Rethinking
Innateness (Elman et al. [1996])—hasn’t been carried through to the present day.
Neuroconstructivism, after receiving a lot of attention from philosophers in the early ‘90s,
has more recently dropped off the philosophical radar (for example, the Philosophers’ Index
database lists only three articles on neuroconstructivism in the 2000s). I find this rather odd. In
this article (and in other projects), by returning (as a philosopher) to standard neuroconstructi-
vism, I attempt to bring it back to philosophy, and to make it the centre of a fresh and new
theoretical debate.
5 The concept of patterned practices refers to the persistent participation of subjects in certain
socio-cultural activities (for example, spending hours listening to and producing music).
Participating in these socio-cultural activities and so taking part in a particular pattern of
practice drives how subjects perform, and regulates how people perceive and act in particular
group- and context-specific ways.
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picture and aims at radicalizing it by proposing a friendly revision of its frame-
work (what I call neo-neuroconstructivism).
In Section 2, I present Marcus’s neo-nativism and assess his attempt to
reconcile nativism with developmental plasticity. In Section 3, I argue that,
in doing so, Marcus ends up reconfiguring nativism until it comes very close in
all but jargon to standard neuroconstructivism. I also suggest that despite his
more sophisticated nativism (one that claims to be able to account for both
innateness and developmental plasticity), Marcus still significantly under-
emphasizes the importance of neural plasticity and the relevance of construct-
ive mechanisms of learning for the development of our cognitive functions.
According to Marcus, learning is guided by a tiny number of genes (Marcus
[2004b]), which serve our brain as an ancillary tool for reprogramming both
its configuration and cognitive responses in accordance with very minor (and
restricted) critical environmental stimulation. Contra Marcus’s neo-nativism,
I argue that rather than a ‘tiny number of genes’, it is cortical plasticity that
enables our distinctive intelligent behaviour to emerge from the enmeshing,
on multiple timescales, of our on-board neural machineries with the wider
world. I defend in Section 4 a view I label ’neo-neuroconstructivism’, in
which enskillment plays a crucial role, and which emphasizes the extraordin-
ary power of our sociocultural/technological environs in moulding the func-
tions and processes of our brains.
Congruent with standard neuroconstructivism, I therefore claim that
although there might be some prewired, softly specialized circuits in place in
the brain prior to birth (developmental bootstrapping precursors that become
obsolete, rather than pre-established, permanent architecture for cognition),
their organization, as well as their cognitive functions, can be continually
altered and rewired through patterned practices (Roepstorff et al. [2010])
and culturally specific activities (Han and Northoff [2008]). Unlike standard
neuroconstructivism, I emphasize that the constraints imposed on develop-
ment by prior architectures in the early stages of life can be dramatically
rewired throughout the teenage years due to a second, intense period of syn-
aptic plasticity found in adolescence (Sowell et al. [1999]; Giedd et al. [2006]);
and I stress the pivotal role that evolving socio-cultural environs play in
influencing and re-directing the developmental path during adulthood. In
other words, I take the second (dramatic) window of opportunity found in
adolescence to point to the need for a friendly revision of the standard neu-
roconstructivist framework, especially in terms of its emphasis on the sensitive
window for learning in infancy. I then argue that, besides this second window
of opportunity, there is still a constant, obviously less dramatic though still
quite remarkable, degree of rewiring (which has been neglected by both neo-
nativism and standard neuroconstructivism), that goes on throughout the
entire lifespan and that this rewiring is best explained by adding to the
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standard neuroconstructivist picture another dimension, namely, dynamic
enskillment.6 To corroborate this hypothesis, I present a number of crucial
case studies in cultural and social neuroscience. I wrap up this article (Section
5) by showing how these findings shed light on the plastic and highly malleable
nature of our minds and take them to undermine Marcus’s version of nativ-
ism. From the analysis of these results, I also draw the conclusion that the
original (standard) neuroconstructivist framework, in order to accommodate
the role that evolving social environments play in adulthood (what I call the
dynamic enskillment) and the second dramatic window of opportunity for
learning, needs a friendly revision, and argue that the pay-off of this suggested
update (the neo-neuroconstructivism view I am after) is highly desirable.
2 Marcus’s Neo-nativism
In The Birth of The Mind ([2004a]),7 Gary Marcus reconfigures the hardwired
nativist position, according to which our minds come to experience the world
fully equipped with pre-specified knowledge and endowed with a set of inborn
mechanisms, which are ‘innate’ and hardwired into the brain at birth.8 These
mechanisms are thought to be the result of dedicated and specialized cognitive
mechanisms tailored by natural selection over evolutionary time (Barkow et
al. [1992]; Pinker [1997]). To fulfil his goal, Marcus makes two crucial moves.
First, he abandons strong genetic determinism,9 the view that describes the
genome as being shaped by natural selection to become the blueprint for
development and instead conceives of genetic activity in terms of ‘cascades’
6 Explaining why some rewiring throughout a lifetime is incompatible with neo-nativism and with
standard neuroconstructivism is going to take some doing, but I shall make the argument for
this claim below.
7 In this article, I focus on Marcus’s ([2004a]) book (although it is a popular one) because it
represents a sort of watershed in his academic career. It summarizes many of Marcus’s previous
ideas about connectionism, constructivism (Marcus [1998]), and brain plasticity (Marcus
[2001]); at the same time, it points to the development of his thought into new fields (for
example, Marcus [2012]).
8 Innateness is one of the central concepts in cognitive science, but also one of the most puzzling
and, as Griffiths ([2002]) has noticed, a source of considerable confusion. Mameli and Bateson
([2006], pp. 177–8) have helpfully distinguished twenty-six definitions of innateness in the sci-
entific literature. More recently, Griffiths and colleagues ([2009]) have systematized these def-
initions along three core dimensions. However, a growing consensus in the literature holds that
in light of all this ambiguity, the very concept of innateness is a misguided folk concept. So, as an
anonymous reviewer rightly pointed out, ‘if this concept is so imprecise, what hangs on whether
we label Marcus as a nativist or not?’. I emphasize in this article (despite the ambiguity of the
notion of innateness) that I am trying to identify one important strand (neo-nativism) within the
complex range of nativist positions and that this strand is the one at stake here.
9 In the context of natural selection, strong genetic determinism attempts to describe evolution
through the differential survival of competing genes: those genes whose phenotypic effects ef-
fectively promote the reproductive success of the organism throughout generations will be fa-
vourably selected to the detriment to their competitors. Thus, proponents of this approach
argue that genes are the driving force of evolution, which exclusively takes place by change in
their frequency.
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or ‘self-regulating recipes’ (Marcus [2004b], p. 169). Second, he renounces the
hardwiring account of psychological development and with it the existence at
birth of domain-specific, functionally specifiable modules. Rather, Marcus
endorses a ‘prewiring’ understanding of the evolution of our cognitive behav-
iour, according to which some of our brain structures possess prewired pat-
terns (independently of learning and experience), but learning and experience
can impact on these patterns by partially reprogramming and redirecting their
functions in later stages of development. In this section I discuss Marcus’s
approach, focusing in particular on his idea of prewiring. Before I describe
how Marcus’s notion of prewiring informs his neo-nativism, let me quickly
look at the way he understands genetic activity, as this provides him with the
conceptual palette necessary to develop his positive proposal.
In his book, Marcus attacks strong genetic determinism and, in place of the
hardwired psychological nativism related to it, he defends a more liberal
account of the development of our cognitive functions, one that emphasizes
the power of gene cascades in regulating (or better ‘controlling’ (p. 163) and
‘supervising’ (p. 168), to use Marcus’s terminology) the multi-branched con-
struction of phenotypic structures.10 The idea is that ‘each gene contributes to
many phenotypic structures and each phenotypic structure depends on many
genes’ (Mameli and Papineau [2006], p. 560). ‘Without genes’, Marcus claims,
‘learning would not exist’ (Marcus [2004b], p. 170). So, cascades of genes
create the complexities of human thought by being actively involved in pro-
cesses of learning—that is, by supporting, changing, and modifying the neural
structures that underlie our cognitive architectures. Learning, on Marcus’s
account, consists of several different sets of distinctly and uniquely specialized
subtasks, each supported by a specific bit of neural activity fine-tuned by
experiences that have been appropriately mediated by the regulatory action
of a relatively ‘tiny’ number of genes (p. 105). Thus, learning is facilitated by (i)
genetic activity (p. 109), and (ii) a moderate amount of experience-dependent
mechanisms used to tune the modules and the connections between them (p.
105).
Marcus also emphasizes the ‘electrical nature’ of learning and repeatedly
asserts that learning often requires some sort of electrical activity to be trig-
gered in the brain. He discusses a series of interesting studies on synaptic
strengthening and shows that the electrical activity underlying processes of
synaptic activation is necessary to trigger cascades of genes that result in the
production of actions that are in the long term instrumental for learning.
Cascades of genes and the electrical activity of the synapses, he argues,
10 Because a gene can trigger the action of another gene, which in turn might trigger the action of
several others, and so on, it is customary to call the process by virtue of which these complex
activations are realized ‘gene cascades’. With the expression ‘gene cascades’, biologists describe
the gene regulatory networks, whose actions provide a way for evolutionary novelty to emerge.
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work in parallel and are in most cases entangled and deeply interwoven. So,
for Marcus, the electrical impulses generated by the synapses, and the inter-
action between external environment and sensory apparatuses mediated by
the regulatory power of genes are essential for the fine-tuning of our cognitive
capacities. Marcus uses this idea of gene-driven development as a conceptual
palette for his prewired neo-nativism, according to which the prewired con-
figuration of our brain can only be reprogrammed by the action of cascades of
genes in conjunction with restricted environmental exposure. In what remains
of this section, I describe Marcus’s notion of ‘prewiring’ and finish up by
showing how it fits in his account of brain development.
Marcus distinguishes between ‘hardwiring’ and ‘prewiring’. Certain skills or
abilities are hardwired if they are built in the brain prior to birth, that is, if
their development is predetermined by the genome and they develop through
rigid, domain-specific mechanisms of learning. Marcus doesn’t believe that
hardwired nativism is the right way to think about psychological develop-
ment and, on the grounds of both theoretical considerations concerning the
complexities of genetic expression and experimental evidence pointing to a
crucial role of sustained experiences in the development and organization of
our cognitive functions, he rejects it. He argues instead for a more sophisti-
cated form of nativism, one that puts the idea of prewiring at the core of
his proposal. As Mameli and Papineau ([2006], p. 563) put it, for Marcus
something is prewired if ‘there is a default setting that gets inscribed
prior to learning, but which can later be rewired by subsequent sensory
experience’. Thus, for Marcus, there is no one-to-one mapping between
genes and neurons:
The role of individual genes is not so much to give pixelwise portraits of
finished products as to provide something far more subtle: an environ-
mentally sensitive set of instructions for constructing (and maintaining)
organisms. (Marcus [2009], p. 149)
Therefore, there is no conflict between prewiring and rewiring on his account:
‘If the human mind is neither rigid and fixed nor arbitrarily malleable, it is
precisely because genes are conditional recipes rather than blueprints’
(Marcus [2009], p.151).
In other words, to be ‘prewired’ is not to be utterly unmalleable, but rather
to be organized in advance of experience. Just because something is pre-
programed at birth, Marcus notes, it doesn’t necessarily mean that it cannot
be reprogrammed later in life. However, since reprogramming via learning is
costly and evolutionarily demanding, Marcus argues that this cannot be the
general norm. Rather, normally development is driven from within the organ-
ism by ‘internally self-generated experiences’ (Marcus [2004b], p. 106).
An interesting example that Marcus discusses to highlight the power of this
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internally self-generated activity concerns the way in which primates develop
stereo vision (for more details see section ‘autodidact’ in (Marcus [2004b],
p. 108)). Many species of monkeys develop stereo vision by fine-tuning their
ocular dominance columns11 in a darkened womb,12 without the influence of
any external input—that is, by spontaneously generating their own experience
via specific internal molecular cues. The idea is that normal development
is just like development in these monkeys, the product of internally genera-
ted activity (mostly) regulated by the power of gene cascades (Marcus [2004b],
p. 109).13 When cortical structures do get reprogrammed later in life, by being
rewired in accordance to environmentally generated patterns, learning (the
electrical process triggered by synaptic activation in conjunction with the
regulatory activity of cascades of genes) does not proceed by overriding the
internally generated structures, but rather improves upon them, repurposing
their distinctive functions. Prewiring thus becomes the keystone of Marcus’s
neo-nativism: it allows him to explain developmental flexibility and the plas-
ticity of our cognitive functions, while hanging on to a nativist stance about
the nature and structure of our minds.
With this discussion of genetic activity and prewiring in place, Marcus
develops a reasonable middle-ground position that is capable of accounting
(even experimentally) for both innateness and developmental plasticity.
Marcus can do this, so he claims at least, because he believes that a number
of cognitive structures are inborn, emphasizes the importance of gene cascades
in guiding and directing the developmental process, acknowledges the role of
developmental plasticity in both brain organization and cognitive develop-
ment, thinks that (in principle at least) everything can be rewired, and so
recognizes the role of very specific environmental exposure in moulding, for-
ging, and sculpting the functioning of our brain.
11 Ocular dominance columns are clusters of neurons present in the striate cortex of many mam-
mals (including humans) that are particularly sensitive to inputs from one eye or the other.
12 Analogous findings have been observed in turtles and mice. Scientists have consistently demon-
strated that embryonic vertebrate brains instinctively produce neurons before their senses can
enter into contact with the world (Coppinger and Coppinger [2001]), and that this self-generated
activity enables those brains to refine their own pre-existing wiring (Wickett et al. [2000]).
13 Here I would like to hint at a possible criticism of Marcus’s view. Hochman ([2013]) has recently
argued that a phylogeny fallacy (Lickliter and Berry [1990]) is committed when what looks like a
proximate explanation is given as an evolutionary explanation in disguise. Though there is not
enough room in this article to come to a conclusion on this issue, it is interesting to ask whether
Marcus commits this fallacy here. When Marcus says that it makes (evolutionarily) sense to use
prewired, genetically driven developmental strategies without describing the proximate biology/
neurology related to it, he may be committing the phylogeny fallacy. That is, he might be giving
an evolutionary explanation that looks like it has proximate science supporting it, when it in fact
does not. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for the helpful suggestion.
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Marcus is right in many ways: He is right when he attacks strong instruc-
tionism and the hardwired account of psychological development related to
it.14 He is right when he asserts that genetic activity is designed to respond to
environmental cues in the course of natural development. He is right when he
accepts the existence of a degree of plasticity in our brain. He is right when he
affirms that the environment can play a role in reprogramming our prewired
brains. However, there are some elements (on which more below) that are
missing from his proposal. Moreover, a fundamental question arises when we
look at his neo-nativism: can the approach he is proposing still be considered
as a form of nativism? There seems to be many points of contacts and very few
important differences (as we shall see in the next section) between Marcus’s
neo-nativism and moderate anti-nativist positions (standard neuroconstructi-
vism, for instance). In reconfiguring hardwired nativism, perhaps Marcus has
pushed the nativist position a little bit too far and comes close in all but jargon
to standard neuroconstructivism. In the next section, I explain why.
3 Is Marcus’s Neo-nativism Really a Form of Nativism?
Standard neuroconstructivism, as we have seen in the brief preview in Section
2, proposes a unifying framework for the study of cognition in neuroscience. It
explains the emergence of our cognitive architecture as by-products of the
progressive organization that our brain structures undergo in response to
both internal and external contingencies. Westermann et al. ([2010]) helpfully
describe standard neuroconstructivism as characterizing ‘development as a
trajectory that is shaped by multiple interacting biological and environmental
constraints’ (p. 724), whose guiding principle is the idea of context-dependent
learning, within and between levels of organization. One of the fundamental
aspects of (standard) neuroconstructivism is the acknowledgement that cor-
tical activity, affected by environment, behavioural patterns, and a host of
other influences, can profoundly alter our cognitive architectures. Thus, neu-
roconstructivism, unlike traditional nativism, does not prescribe the onto-
logical priority of a specific level of analysis over another, but rather calls
for ‘consistency between the neural and cognitive levels in characterizing de-
velopmental trajectories’ (Westermann et al. [2007], p. 76). Standard neuro-
constructivists posit the interrelatedness (on multiple timescales) of brain,
14 Strong instructionism, according to Wheeler ([2007]), ’is the claim that what it means for some
element to code for an outcome is for that element to fully specify the distinctive features of that
outcome, where “full specification” requires that the kind of exhaustive predictive power just
indicated may, in principle, be achieved on the basis purely of what may be known about the
putatively representational factor’ (Wheeler [2007], p. 377). In the context of natural selection,
strong instructionism is the view that the genotype is the blueprint for the organism, the holy
grail of biology, the recipe for development.
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body, and world, and argue that the interweaving of all these factors is equally
important for brain development.15
So, standard neuroconstructivists do not embrace a reductionist standpoint
in which cognitive change can be explained solely in terms of neural adapta-
tion; rather, they describe cortical specialization as the results of an intricate
process in which constrained mental representations get reshaped via learning
and experience-dependent activities. Crucial in this respect is the debt that
standard neuroconstructivism owes to Piaget’s ([1953]) theory of cognitive
development, according to which intellectual development goes through
four fundamental stages (sensorimotor, preoperational, concrete
operational, and formal operational), and knowledge is the result of a pro-
gressive reorganization of mental processes that is determined by biological
maturation and specific environmental experience. Thus, standard neurocon-
structivists strongly emphasize the role of developmental plasticity and spe-
cific environmental exposure in the unfolding of our cognitive behaviour.
Having presented the conceptual palette on which standard neuroconstructi-
vists rely, I now want to investigate the relationship between standard neuro-
constructivism and Marcus’s neo-nativism. Let me begin by looking at
how they diverge. I will then turn to the points of contact and will argue
that neo-nativism can be accommodated within the richer framework pro-
vided by standard neuroconstructivism.
It is obvious that there are some differences between Marcus’s view and
standard neuroconstructivism. Even if both Marcus and standard neuro-
constructivists broadly agree that in the context of brain development every-
thing can in principle be ‘rewirable’, they fundamentally disagree on the
importance of developmental processes in generating our cognitive architec-
tures. More specifically, Marcus believes (i) that certain (quite a few) funda-
mental cognitive and anatomical structures are the result of domain-specific
learning (although there is room for domain-general learning on his account,
and this is how Marcus differs from hardwired nativism); (ii) that these struc-
tures remain as almost-intact prewirings in the mature brain; and (iii) that
gene cascades is what really matters in explaining their development. Standard
neuroconstructivists, by contrast, think (i) that learning is essentially domain-
general; (ii) that only a very restricted number of cognitive functions develop
independently of learning and experience; (iii) that nearly all prewired mod-
ules present in the brain at birth get rewired during the developmental process;
15 There is a strong analogy between the neuroconstructivist idea of brain development and the
concept of interactive constructionism (on which more in Section 5 below) as proposed by
developmental systems theorists (for example, Shea [2011]; Oyama et al. [2001]) in evolutionary
biology.
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and (iv) that gene-environment cascades, rather than just gene cascades,
are crucial to understand the developmental process. These differences lead
us to the real source of disagreement between these two accounts, that is, the
extent to which learning and experience are believed to impact on the devel-
opment of the brain. So, the main difference between these two approaches is
essentially quantitative, involving the proportion of cases in which there is a
key role for learning.16 For Marcus, it makes sense (evolutionarily) to use
prewired, genetically driven developmental strategies (strategies that do not
rely too much on learning, because learning is costly and demanding) to guide
and direct the development of our cognitive behaviour. For standard neuro-
constructivists, on the other hand, it seems perfectly legitimate to affirm that
the experience can play a major role in the developmental process because
learning makes brain development more sensitive and adaptable to local
conditions.
Despite the disagreement on this critical issue, it nevertheless seems that
when we look at both accounts on a broader scale, neo-nativism and standard
neuroconstructivism also share many important assumptions. First, both
Marcus and standard neuroconstructivists recognize the existence of inborn
mechanisms and predispositions, that is, both acknowledge the presence
of cognitive constraints on development at birth. Second, both recognize
(to a different degree) the role of learning and experience in the developing
of our cognitive behaviour. Third, both accounts believe in rewiring. Fourth,
both think of genes as crucial for brain development. Fifth, both approaches
emphasize the crucial contribution of environments and talk of gene–
environment cascades. Sixth, both renounce hardwired (strong) nativism.
Seventh, both views agree that the developmental data cannot be ignored.
Eighth, both acknowledge the role of cortical plasticity in moulding our cog-
nitive functions. Thus, both Marcus and the standard neuroconstructivists
draw on a similar conceptual palette.
This, however, leaves us with an important question: do these approaches
really belong to different, antithetical traditions?17 It seems to me, given the
many similarities listed in the previous paragraph, that these views could be
16 It is important to note that one of the insights that could be attributed to neuroconstructivists is
that there are all sorts of developmentally important experiences that would not at all be
construed as ‘learning’ in the traditional sense. To pick just one example, perceiving patterned
light binocularly has important effects on brain structure, but such perception would not or-
dinarily be considered a form of ‘learning’. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing this
point.
17 This question has both an historical and a conceptual reading. The two approaches belong to
very different, antithetic traditions in terms of their history (and maybe sociology). However,
I am arguing that, despite this, they are (surprisingly) conceptually close. Thanks to John Sutton
for pointing out this distinction.
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compatible overall, and that the differences one can find between them are due
to a degree of emphasis, and are thus comparable to those one might find
within two different approaches belonging to the same research paradigm.
This entails another, perhaps more important question: how can two explicitly
divergent proposals (one nativist, the other anti-nativist) converge so as to
share that many conceptual assumptions? I think there is a reason for this
anomalous convergence: Marcus’s neo-nativism (despite his attempt to mag-
nify the differences) doesn’t differ that much from moderate anti-nativist
(standard neuroconstructivist) claims, and I believe it could be accommodated
within its richer theoretical framework. Marcus claims to be a nativist in
public: ‘I’ve always been closer to the nativist side, thinking that there prob-
ably are sophisticated mechanisms built in. I’ve been persuaded by scientists
like Chomsky and Pinker that we start with something interesting in the mind.
We don’t just start with a blank slate’ (Marcus [2004a]).18 In truth, however,
little of a traditional nativist position (except the label) is left in his own
proposal. Marcus’s commitment to the biology of neurological development
and his acknowledgment of the importance of developmental variation forces
him into necessary compromises, which bring him close in all but jargon to a
standard neuroconstructivist account. Thus, I find no compelling reason to
classify his account within the nativist tradition, and rather think that it can be
inscribed within the richer, more encompassing, and better suited (standard)
neuroconstructivist framework.
So far, we have seen that Marcus and standard neuroconstructivists
hold similar (though obviously not identical) positions and share many
assumptions. On these grounds, I have argued that Marcus’s neo-nativism
could be accommodated within the richer theoretical framework provided
by standard neuroconstructivism. Having claimed this, I now want to turn
to the second main goal of this essay—the friendly revision of standard neu-
roconstructivism—and present my positive proposal in more detail. In the
next section of this article, I will concentrate on what I shall call ‘dynamic
enskillment’, the combination of developmental plasticity and constructive
mechanisms of learning, with socio-cultural activities and patterned practices.
By adding these elements to the standard neuroconstructivist framework
presented earlier and, in particular, by focusing on the idea that differently
wired brains are the result of engagement in different practices, I want to argue
for a view (neo-neuroconstructivism) that acknowledges all forms of possible
construction throughout the lifespan.
18 It is important to note that this is a straw man version of the critics of nativism.
Neuroconstructivists certainly do not believe that we begin life with a blank slate.
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4 Neo-neuroconstructivism and Dynamic Enskillment
Before I go on to describe my positive proposal in more detail, let me briefly
remind the reader of the overall aim and dialectic of this article. The view I am
endorsing (neo-neuroconstructivism) is not meant to constitute an attack on
standard neuroconstructivism; rather, it is an attempt to revise it in light of a
number of recent empirical findings in neuropsychology and cultural/social
neuroscience. So, my proposal simply aims at adding another dimension (the
dynamic enskillment) to the standard neuroconstructivist framework. In other
words, there is nothing about the view I want to endorse that is hostile
to standard neuroconstructivism—quite the opposite. A genuine (standard)
constructivist should like my view and especially its focus on dynamic
enskillment.
Standard neuroconstructivism characterizes development as a trajectory
that is shaped by multiple interacting biological and environmental con-
straints, in which complex representations develop based on earlier and sim-
pler ones. This increase in representational complexity is realized through
a progressive elaboration of functional cortical structures, which are not
selected from a constrained juvenile stock, but rather emerge in an experi-
ence-dependent way. Standard neuroconstructivists argue for progressive
elaboration of neural structures. There is a sensitive period for learning and
it is only if the early structures are in place that the later structures will develop
since these build on what has occurred during the short phase-sensitive win-
dows of opportunity that characterize childhood. This doesn’t imply that the
brain can’t continue to change itself through learning at later stages, just that
the ways in which it can change itself—the new structures it can build—are
severely constrained by experience-dependent activities undergone in early
stages of life (Mareschal et al. [2007]). Thus, learning is (for standard neuro-
constructivists) a constructive mechanism, realized by means of continuous
changes operated on constrained cortical structures in the early stages of life
by experience dependent activities. This notion of learning lies at the very
heart of the standard neuroconstructivist framework and it is absolutely para-
mount to understand it.
While fundamentally agreeing with standard neuroconstructivists on their
characterization of learning as a constructive process, I nevertheless disagree
with them on the extent to which learning is taken to be constrained by
experience-dependent activities undergone in early stages of life. In other
words, I do agree with standard neuroconstructivists that early experiences
constrain development; however, I disagree with them on the implications of
their assumption that the constrained and rewired cortical structures acquired
in early stages of infancy cannot be themselves dramatically rewired and
(re-)constrained later in life. Evidence supporting my criticism comes from
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the work carried out by Jay Giedd and colleagues ([2006], [2009]), who re-
cently demonstrated the existence of a second period of synaptic over-produc-
tion (followed by relative pruning of redundant connections) during puberty.
This second wave of synaptic over-production (in all respects analogous to the
one that takes place in early childhood) constitutes a second window of op-
portunity for the developing child. It is characterized by an extremely high
degree of cortical plasticity and, more importantly, allows the developing
adolescent to re-mould and re-forge the constrained cognitive structures
acquired during infancy, preparing the adolescent’s brain to take on the chal-
lenges that lie in the adult years of adulthood. According to Giedd, the struc-
tural changes that rewire the adolescent brain take place in many different
brain regions, but there are three areas that are consistently remoulded: the
nucleus accumbens (mainly responsible for reward-seeking behaviour), the
amygdalae (mainly responsible for memory and emotional reactions), and
the prefrontal cortex (mainly responsible for decision making, personality
expression, and social behaviour).
Giedd’s work provides good empirical evidence for adult neurogenesis, for a
second period of synaptic plasticity during puberty, and more importantly for
the possibility of rewiring already rewired and constrained cortical structures
(the very same structures that were sculpted by experience-dependent activities
during infancy) in adolescence. Giedd’s research confirmed other results
found by neuroscientists (such as Sowell et al. [1999]) at the beginning of
the 2000s. Sowell and colleagues ([1999]) used an MRI to compare the
brains of twelve- to sixteen-year-olds to those of people in their twenties.
They found that the frontal lobes—the areas of the brain that are responsible
for crucial executive functions (such as self-control, judgement, emotional
regulation, organization, and planning)—undergo the greatest change be-
tween puberty and young adulthood, growing considerably and reaching
their peak at ten for girls and twelve for boys. Sowell et al. also found that
the temporal lobes—areas of the brain devoted to emotional control, process-
ing of sensory inputs, and language comprehension—do not reach their grey-
matter peak until age sixteen. But there is more: Giedd’s findings not only
confirm previous results, they were also extensively replicated by other re-
searchers (such as Paus [2005] and Toga et al. [2006]), who pushed the grey-
matter peak well into the twenties. More recently, Lebel and Beaulieu ([2011])
also claimed that ‘the body of the corpus callosum, cingulum, and inferior
longitudinal fasciculus demonstrate prolonged increases, confirming post-
adolescent maturation’ (Lebel and Beaulieu [2011], p. 10946). Together,
these results show that the brain undergoes dramatic dynamic changes
much later than we originally thought; beyond childhood, the brain manifests
dramatic degrees of malleability, peaking during adolescence and continuing
well into early adulthood. Thus, maturity isn’t simply a matter of slipping
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software (learning) into existing equipment. On the contrary, the hardware
profoundly changes and these changes reflect signals from the environment.
Adolescent plasticity, then, can be understood as a period of profound change
in the both the structural and functional organization of the brain
(Choudhury [2010]).
These findings offer some empirical evidence for the friendly revision of the
standard neuroconstructivist framework I suggested at the beginning of my
article. These results profoundly undermine the idea of hard constraints
imposed on development by sustained experiences in the early stages of life
as well as the standard neuroconstructivist assumption of a unique, phase-
sensitive window of opportunity confined to childhood.
More direct evidence for the neo-neuroconstructivism view I am after can
be found in a series of neuroscientific studies in cultural and social neuro-
science that have highlighted the need to add another dimension—the
dynamic enskillment—to the standard neuroconstructivist framework
outlined in precedence. It is to these studies that I now want to turn.
Draganski et al. ([2004]) used brain magnetic resonance imaging to visualize
learning-induced plasticity in the brains of trained volunteers who, over a
period of three months, had learned to juggle from scratch for approximately
sixty seconds without dropping the ball (Draganski et al. [2004], p. 311).
In undergoing their experiment, the team conducted two scans on the subjects
involved. First, the participants’ brains were scanned without prior juggling
skills. Then they were scanned again after three months of intense and con-
tinuous practice. At this stage researchers were looking for changes in the
distribution of brain matter as the jugglers learned their new skill. Using
a specific quantitative measurement technique (morphometry), Draganski
and co-workers then compared the brain scans obtained from the trained
jugglers with scans from non-juggling control subjects. The experimenters
found significant changes in the volume of grey and white matter in the
brain of the jugglers, which displayed a remarkable increase in the grey
matter in brain area V5 in particular (a region typically devoted to the process-
ing of visual movement). These results were later confirmed in a follow-up
study conducted by the same research group (Driemeyer et al. [2008]), who
found an increase in the grey matter in the occipital temporal cortex with
juggling practice, and that this increase in grey matter density was transient,
progressively disappearing after a period (between two and four months) of
failing to practice. These findings are particularly instructive because they
reveal the direct correlation (even on a short-scale period) between skills
and patterned practices (juggling skills in this case) on the one hand, and
adult brain structural organization, on the other.
Cultural and social activities, however, not only determine structural modi-
fications in our brains, but also affect the way they process relevant
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information. We know that there is evidence for dissociated digit and letter
processing in our brains (see Jonides and Gleitman [1972] for instance).
Despite this strong evidence, Polk and Farah ([1998]) designed an experiment
to determine whether or not (extensive and repetitive) socio-cultural activities
undertaken in adulthood could have an effect on this dissociation. They tested
Canadian postal workers who spend eight hours on alternate days sorting mail
by postal code. Unlike many other countries, Canadian postal codes are com-
prised of both letters and numbers (for example L6Y 2N4). This made these
subjects perfect for the purpose of this study. The results the researchers found
were fascinating: in comparison to their fellow postal workers who do not sort
mail, Canadian mail sorters show significantly less behavioural evidence for
segregated letter and digit processing (Polk and Farah [1998]). What we learn
from this study is that culture and social practises can deeply and profoundly
affect neurocognitive processing, impacting on the functioning of our brains,
and continually rewiring any alleged pre-determined developmental outcome.
Further evidence attesting to the effects of skills and abilities on the
recruitment and functioning of our cognitive architectures can be found
in recent neuroimaging studies conducted on musicians. Ohnishi and col-
leagues ([2001]) in particular compared the brain activation of expert mu-
sicians with that of non-musicians and found that while listening to the
same piece of music (namely, Bach’s Italian Concerto), musicians and non-
musicians displayed different areas of brain activation. In particular, sub-
jects who were unfamiliar with classical music showed significant brain ac-
tivity in the secondary auditory association area in the right temporal
cortex, whereas the musicians showed brain activity in the auditory associ-
ation area in the left temporal cortex and in the left posterior dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex—the brain regions dedicated to the processing of language
and working memory, respectively (Ohnishi et al. [2001]). This study once
again reveals the power of rewiring, and how specific skills and abilities can
affect the processing and the functioning of our brains, determining very
different (mostly culturally driven) neural responses.
Similar results were also found in jazz musicians. Vuust et al. ([2005])
demonstrated that ‘pre-attentive brain responses recorded with magneto-
encephalography to rhythmic incongruence are left-lateralized in expert jazz
musicians and right-lateralized in musically inept non-musicians’ (Vuust et al.
[2005], p. 560). The authors, in particular, interpreted this left lateralization as
reflecting the functional adaptation of the musicians’ brain to a particular
communication task (the production of music) that, for the musicians, was
very much like a language.19 Vuust et al. ([2009]) subsequently observed that
19 We know that the left hemisphere of the brain is responsible for language and speech produc-
tion. It is probably this that has provided the authors with the analogy between music and
language production.
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jazz musicians, when compared to non-musicians, exhibit a larger and earlier
MMNm response to unanticipated deviations in rhythmic presentations.20
This much larger and earlier response is probably due to the fact that these
unanticipated rhythmical deviations are key elements in mediating communi-
cation when jazz musicians improvise (Vuust and Roepstorff [2008];
Roepstorff et al. [2010]). So, it looks like the brains of professional jazz mu-
sicians react to rhythmic deviations more significantly and in a shorter period
of time than the brains of non-musicians, and that this happens because jazz
musicians (as opposed to non-musicians) are routinely engaged in musical
practices that continually involve these deviations and improvisations, and
thus consistently redeploy the same neuronal patterns to make sense of them.
Again, this confirms the crucial role that cultural practices and social activities
play in redirecting the development of our cognitive functions, even in
adulthood.
Where do all these findings leave us? Before I look at the relevance of these
results for the views I presented earlier on in the article, let me briefly connect
them with the existing philosophical literature. I believe the notion of dynamic
enskillment goes rather well with recent work conducted on cultural scaffold-
ing in that philosophy of biology (Sterelny [2003]) and especially with the
apprentice learning model developed by Sterelny ([2012]). The apprentice
learning model highlights the role of adaptations in contexts of learning and
teaching. For Sterelny, human evolution is not driven by domain-specific
modules—pre-determined responses to problems raised by the environ-
ment—rather, it is driven by social cooperation, hybrid learning, communi-
cation skills, foraging strategies, and depends on planning, development, and
intergenerational transmission of local expertise and technology. Thus, the
apprentice learning proposal explains the development of human cognitive
capital via high-volume, high-fidelity, large scale, reliable processes of cultural
learning, and through cross-generation information pooling. A crucial role in
the apprentice model is played by cultural inheritance: the generation-by-
generation accumulation of information. Cultural inheritance is the result
of the interaction of cultural learning and information pooling. Humans of
one generation scaffold and transform (via developmental plasticity) the
learning environment of the next generation, thereby creating (via positive
feedback loops) a trans-generational exchanging of skills and practices. This
can turbo boost their ‘turbo boost’ survival capacity and fitness in the long
20 The mismatch negativity (MMN) is a brain response to violations of a rule, established by a
sequence of sensory stimuli (Na¨a¨ta¨nen [1992]). It can occur in any sensory system, but is typ-
ically studied for audition and vision. In the case of auditory stimulation, the MMN occurs after
a sporadic change in a frequent and repetitive series of sounds. For instance, a deviant and
infrequent (p) sound can be interspersed among a sequence of frequent and repetitive (d) sounds
(for example, ddddddddddddd-p-dddddddddd-p-ddddddd-p-ddddddd . . .).
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run. Thus, in combining (via cognitive re-engineering) information from the
social world with information from the bio-physical realm, the apprentice
learning model configures itself as a process of learning (and rewiring) by
doing (Farina [2012]).
Understood within the philosophical framework provided by the apprentice
learning model, those results from experiments exploring dynamic enskillment
provide strong empirical evidence for the intimate dependence of human cog-
nition (even in adulthood) on both socio-cultural environments and patterned
practices. These results also highlight the power of brain plasticity in enabling
the nervous system to successfully respond to environmental pressures,
physiological changes, and personal experiences during both early adolescence
and adulthood. These findings invite us to partially reconsider the framework
proposed by standard neuroconstructivism (Westermann et al. [2010]) and
also to rethink the idea of a unique, phase-sensitive period for learning.
Although standard neuroconstructivists are right in asserting that the pre-
specifications with which we come to the world are shaped and rewired in
the early stages of our lives by experience-dependent activities and (normally)
cannot be very easily changed thereafter because these early experiences con-
strain subsequent development, it nevertheless seems that these constraints on
development shouldn’t be understood as final: both social and cultural prac-
tices can still dramatically redirect both the development of our cognitive
capacities and the functional organization of our brains in later stages of
life. Culture and society, together with the brain and via cortical plasticity,
provide the lifeblood for constructive mechanisms of learning, and these
mechanisms are spread throughout our entire lifespan. In other words, devel-
opmental windows are not just developmentally determined in early child-
hood, but rather are culturally, socially, and interactively co-constructed
throughout an entire lifetime.
The conclusion I draw from the two sets of findings mentioned above is the
following: Standard neuroconstructivism remains valid overall as a frame-
work for the study of cognition in neuroscience. However, it needs to be
stretched further to fully account for the kind of plasticity found in adoles-
cence and for the second window of opportunity observed in adulthood. More
specifically, these results indicate that the constructivism of standard neuro-
constructivism is not just (or only) a product of the nervous system’s imma-
turity, but constitutes the longer-term potential of the system—including
cultural, developmental, and social elements.
5 Conclusion
In this final section, I would like to look more specifically at the
implications of the previous results for both neo-nativism and standard
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neuroconstructivism. How do the findings reported above inform Marcus’s
neo-nativism?21
The apprentice learning model and the concept of interactive construction-
ism as developed within developmental systems theory (Oyama et al. [2001])
are interesting and powerful philosophical tools to pair with what we know
about enskillment. Interactive constructionism is the idea that biological de-
velopment and evolution are driven by au-pair interactions between various
resources (genes, environments, and epigenetic factors) without any one inter-
actant being the locus of control. By pairing this notion of interactive con-
structionism with the findings analysed in the previous section on neo-
neuroconstructivism, we gain a better glimpse into the evolution of our cog-
nitive behaviour than if we were to rely exclusively on Marcus’s neo-nativist
approach where, recall, genes retain priority over other developmental factors.
In embracing this truly developmental perspective, we understand that the
environments in which we live has a huge and profound (and by no means
secondary) influence on the initiation and orchestration of specific physio-
logical processes, and in anatomically and functionally organizing our cogni-
tive architectures. Although the anatomical structures and the cognitive
architectures that characterize our brains develop through a common devel-
opmental path, they continually interact with one another and with their
environment to change each other’s functions—as in a cascading waterfall,
where the water changes the stream bed and the stream bed affects the speed
and path that the water takes. From these studies, we also understand that
Marcus’s idea of prewiring is problematic and should be replaced with a
broader understanding that emphasizes the power of plasticity and rewiring
throughout the entire lifespan. Sociocultural-based activities profoundly
affect our mature cognitive architectures and what is pre-wired at birth is
massively rewired (via patterned practices, culturally specific activities, and
social engagements) later on.
But how do the findings presented above inform standard neuro-
constructivism? Standard neuroconstructivism is indeed sympathetic with
the notion of interactive constructionism. However, as discussed above, stand-
ard neuroconstructivism has failed to fully take into account the importance
of plasticity, enculturation, and dynamic enskillment throughout the lifespan.
The research on enskillment suggests that standard neuroconstructivists need
to revise their framework so as to accommodate the second window of op-
21 Although I have argued that Marcus’s neo-nativism could be accommodated within the richer
theoretical framework provided by standard neuroconstructivism, I haven’t actually claimed
that the two views are coincident; I believe it is appropriate to analyse these approaches
separately in this final section.
Mirko Farina20
 at N
ortheastern U
niversity Libraries on January 8, 2015
http://bjps.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
portunity for learning, and the dramatic role that cultural practices and social
activities play, not only in early childhood, but also throughout the entire
lifespan. So, the findings discussed in Section 4 suggest a friendly restyling
of the standard neuroconstructivist palette.
However, standard neuroconstructivists could resist this conclusion and
object: The point about the second sensitivity window is a good one, which
we failed to take into account (I grant you that); but it is just an empirical
point in developmental neuroscience. How is this point philosophically rele-
vant to our framework? In other words, what is there in the theory or in the
conclusions that are drawn from the theory that is altered once we extend the
sensitivity window? Couldn’t the second window of opportunity and the find-
ings reported in favour of the neo-neuroconstructivist view (and, in particular,
dynamic enskillment) be accommodated by just a minor tweak to the standard
neuroconstructivist theory?
This is a good objection, but there are ways to resist it. The theoretical
framework to which these two research paradigms appeal is very different.
One (the standard neuroconstructivist) looks at early infancy as the period in
which the crucial learning takes place; the other (neo-neuroconstructivism)
with dynamic enskillment proposes to investigate the effect of patterned prac-
tices and environmentally driven (cultural and social) activities throughout
the entire lifetime, and challenges the existence of a unique sensitive window
for learning. Modularity theorists such as Marcus ([2004b]) have tried to
appropriate constructivist ideas to account for the role of development.
In particular, they have taken the existence of a unique sensitive period for
learning to be fully compatible with the assumption that the innate predispos-
itions with which we come to the world will fully mature in early infancy, in
response to experience-dependent activities. Thanks to these experience-
dependent activities, it is claimed, the modules’ functions are tuned up and
fixed in stone so that they don’t change, or change to a very limited extent,
later in life. But here there is a question that needs to be answered: how can
the nativists account for the existence of a second massive and dramatic
window of opportunity in early adolescence? If those modules had fully
matured in early infancy, realizing their function through positive interactions
with the environment, will they now need to mature once more? Saying so
would sound like an ad hoc hypothesis generated to rescue theoretical claims
and to account for negative counter-evidence. Of course, such a hypothesis
could still be made, but then there would be other concerns to worry about.
For instance, how many maturation periods should we expect to explain the
development of our cognitive behaviour? None (as the original nativists envi-
saged), one (as everyone is prone to concede now), or two or more (constant
rewiring, as dynamic enskillment envisages)? And for how long does this mat-
uration continue in our life? It seems the price to pay for accepting the second
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window of opportunity and the dynamic enskillment within the nativist frame-
work would be too high for the nativist; it would cause a collapse of the
original nativist position, leaving a much softer, non-nativist understanding.
What would be left (if not the label) of the original nativist position when we
push rewiring and development so well into adulthood?
So, to answer the standard neuroconstructivist objection, the empirical
point about the second window of opportunity, and the impact of skills and
cultural engagements throughout the lifespan, is relevant to the standard
neuroconstructivist framework. It is essential to: (i) pose an original (yet un-
answered) challenge to neo-nativist accounts of brain development; (ii) move
the focus of the literature in a new direction, beyond mere ‘pre-wiring’ and
towards ‘rewiring’; and (iii) encourage attention on previously neglected life-
stages of plasticity, which in turn provide significant evidence for the implaus-
ibility of neo-nativism. For these reasons, it seems fair to suggest a friendly
revision of the standard neuroconstructivist framework along the lines envi-
saged by neo-neuroconstructivism and dynamic enskillment. That is, standard
neuroconstructivism should recognize all forms of possible scaffolding and
construction across the lifespan and not merely focus on (and privilege) one
developmental phase.
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